Scale Up Sourcebook by Cooley, Larry & Howard, Julie
CO N T E N T S
Foreword
Purdue University—Mitch Daniels, President v
African Development Bank—Akinwumi A. Adesina, President vi
Executive Summary vii
Introduction  1
Chapter 1 Designing Projects and Innovations with Scale in Mind 3
Chapter 2 Assessing Scalability  6
Chapter 3 Using Commercial Markets to Drive Pro-Poor Scaling 9
Chapter 4 Financing the Transition to Scale  12
Chapter 5  Creating an Enabling Environment for Scale—Partnerships, Policy,  
Behavioral Change, and Institutions 17
Chapter 6  Tailoring Metrics, Monitoring, and Evaluation to Support Sustainable  
Outcomes at Scale  22
Chapter 7 The Critical Role of Intermediary and Donor Organizations  25
Chapter 8 Conclusions  28
Chapter 9 An Invitation to Continue the Conversation 29
Notes 31
The content of the Scale Up Sourcebook was informed by a Scale Up Conference organized by  Purdue 
University and held in West Lafayette, Indiana, USA, on September 25–27, 2018. The conference was 
made possible by Purdue’s partner organization, the African Development Bank, and company spon-
sors, which included BASF, Bayer, Corteva Agriscience, and Land O’Lakes. Lead conference organizers at 
Purdue University were Suzanne Nielsen (Professor of Food Science; Faculty Fellow in the Office of Cor-
porate & Global Partnerships) and Carolyn Woo (Emeritus President and CEO of Catholic Relief Services; 
Distinguished President’s Fellow for Global Development at Purdue University). The keynote speaker at 
the conference was Akinwumi Adesina (President of the African Development Bank, 2017 World Food 
Prize laureate, and Purdue alumnus). Over 200 persons from 20 countries, representing over 90 organiza-
tions, attended this conference that focused on how to best scale agricultural technologies and inno-
vations to impact millions in the developing world. The objectives of the conference were to enhance 
understanding of scaling up, establish a network among agricultural experts working in developing 
countries, and aid in the spread of technologies that will feed our growing global population. Two major 
conference participants and experts in the area of scale up, Larry Cooley and Julie Howard (see bios at 
end of book), accepted the challenge to write this Scale Up Sourcebook, which is intended to capture 
the spirit and content of the Scale Up Conference, continue the conversation on scale up, and serve as 
a user guide on the topic. 
—Suzanne Nielsen, Co-organizer of Scale Up Conference  
and Project Manager for Scale Up Sourcebook
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FOREWORD BY PRESIDENT  
MITCHELL E. DANIELS, JR.
Few events could kick-off Purdue’s 150th Anniversary celebration quite like 
the Scale Up Conference, which we were proud to host in partnership with the 
African Development Bank in September 2018. 
Celebrating our position as a leading land-grant university, the theme of our 
yearlong celebration is “150 Years of Giant Leaps,” recalling Boilermaker 
astronaut Neil Armstrong’s famous words upon the first moon landing 50 
years ago. The theme also honors the footprints that Purdue alumni have left 
across the U.S. and around the world, like those of Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, 
keynote speaker at the Scale Up Conference. Dr. Adesina is president of the 
African Development Bank and in 2017 became the most recent of three 
World Food Prize winners whom Purdue proudly claims as alumni.
The Scale Up Conference tackled one of the most important topics in agriculture: leveraging globally the technology 
and innovations designed to improve food security, nutrition, and livelihoods in the developing world. More than 200 
people from 20 countries and some 90 organizations attended the conference, establishing a broad network among 
agricultural experts committed to feeding our growing global population. 
In his keynote, Dr. Adesina challenged attendees to find new ways to create impact through what he described as the 
“Scaling Up Triangle”—strong and sustained political will, the power of science and technology, and suitable policy 
incentives. A video recording of Dr. Adesina’s remarks and other featured presentations and panel discussions, photos, 
and additional conference materials are available through Purdue e-Pubs (docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup). 
In partnership with and through generous support from the African Development Bank, Purdue University has published 
this Sourcebook on scaling agricultural innovation. Authored by Larry Cooley and Julie Howard, experts in international 
development, the Sourcebook summarizes key insights, tools, examples, and references on designing for scale, assessing 
scalability, financing the scaling process, and the effective use of partnerships to support scaling. It is intended for a broad 
audience in academia, research institutions, governments, businesses, policy groups, and nongovernmental organizations 
concerned with leveraging agricultural innovation to meet the needs of the developing nations.
Purdue is proud of the role its faculty and alumni have always played in conquering world hunger, and we hope this 
guidebook serves you well in your efforts to do the same. 
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SCALE UP: A NECESSITY FOR TRANSFORMING  
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
The African Development Bank was honored to co-organize the Scaling 
Up Agricultural Technologies for Transformation conference with Purdue 
University (my alma mater) on the occasion of Purdue’s 150th Anniversary 
celebrations.  
The “Giant Leaps” theme for the anniversary is consistent with my own convic-
tion that now is the time for transforming agriculture into an engine of growth 
for Africa’s economies and a pathway to prosperity for millions of its people.
All the conditions for African agriculture’s “Giant Leap” are in place: Africa 
holds 65% of all the uncultivated arable land left in the world, and the technologies to transform this resource into a 
breadbasket of healthy, nutritious food and finished agricultural products exist. What remains is a systematic process to 
deploy these technologies and the required complementary services to millions of farmers, while stimulating value addi-
tion and unlocking regional and global markets.
This Sourcebook, distilling the incredible expertise, groundbreaking innovations, and examples of successful scale on 
display at the conference, will surely serve as a valuable guide for those driven by the imperative to revolutionize African 
agriculture.
As our own commitment to driving technologies at scale, the African Development Bank has launched a $1 billion initia-
tive called “Technologies for African Agri cultural Transformation” (TAAT)—in collaboration with our partners at the 
World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and others.
TAAT is founded on the principles of the “Scaling Up Triangle” that I emphasized in my keynote address. These princi-
ples include the prerequisites of strong political will to ensure enabling infrastructure policies; harnessing innovations 
in science and technology that are tailored to local conditions; and the alignment of incentives that unleash commer-
cial profitability across the agriculture value chain . . . down to the smallholder farmer. 
I believe that this Scale Up Sourcebook will accelerate initiatives that in turn scale up agricultural innovations such as TAAT 
and many more. Harnessing these lessons and tools for concrete impact at scale requires continued and sustained invest-
ments across the board.
We must therefore all honor this commitment. We owe it to ourselves and generations to come to use every opportunity at 
our disposal to make that Giant Leap of agricultural transformation in Africa a reality.
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A decade ago, the audience for a discussion on “scaling” 
international development initiatives could fit comfort-
ably in a telephone booth. But times have changed. Today, 
virtually every serious conversation about development 
includes attention to strategies for achieving and sustain-
ing results at scale; and there is an emerging body of lit-
erature, tools, case examples, and communities of practice 
from which to learn. 
This change reflects growing concern over the seem-
ingly endless array of projects that fail to reach large num-
bers of the poor or to sustain outcomes over time, and the 
mismatch between the magnitude of many of the world’s 
most serious problems and the numerous but relatively 
small donor resources arrayed against those problems.
Despite this growing recognition, major challenges 
remain, including the need for fundamental changes in 
established policies, procedures, and priorities of donor 
agencies, national governments, researchers, and program 
implementers. Most specifically, these changes imply a 
reexamination of the current preoccupation with techno-
logical innovation and “pilot projects,” and a fundamen-
tal rethinking of ways to ensure that donor investments 
are more likely to catalyze lasting, systemic change. This 
reorientation requires (1) designing interventions with 
scale in mind and with clear scaling strategies; (2) assess-
ing and addressing obstacles to scalability; and (3) actively 
managing the pathway to scale. The agriculture sector has 
been slower than some other sectors, most notably health, 
to incorporate these changes.
In an effort to close this gap, Purdue University orga-
nized a major conference in September 2018 on Innovations 
in Agriculture: Scaling Up to Reach Millions, in partnership 
with the African Development Bank. This Sourcebook is 
informed and inspired by that conference and is intended 
as an easy-to-use reference targeting a broad and diverse 
audience drawn from host governments, research institu-
tions, and academic, business, policy, and donor commu-
nities concerned with leveraging agricultural innovation to 
meet the needs of the world’s poor.
The Sourcebook is divided into chapters addressing the 
following issues: designing with scale in mind; assessing 
scalability; using commercial markets to drive scaling; 
financing the transition to scale; creating an enabling envi-
ronment for scale; tailoring metrics, monitoring, and eval-
uation to support sustainable outcomes at scale; and the 
critical role of intermediary and donor organizations. It is 
designed to be a stand-alone source of guidance, tips, and 
examples, and to provide links to additional resources for 
readers wishing for more detail.
Also summarized in the Sourcebook are many of the 
growing array of on-the-ground cases, donor practices, and 
analytic tools that can help to inform future efforts to scale 
agricultural interventions and outcomes. 
The Sourcebook ends with a call to action and highlights 
the following conclusions:
• Delivery at scale is not a gigantic project or a series 
of projects. We need to plan for millions, not thou-
sands; for uncontrolled, not controlled, settings; 
for generations, not for five years; and for address-
ing, not working around, political and market 
realities. 
• This requires narrowing the gap between macro 
goals and micro interventions by linking the 
language and logic of projects to the language and 
logic of development effectiveness. 
• Development assistance can help, but it will not 
solve the problem. Only markets and governments 
can; and commercial markets should normally 
be the default setting. Short-term interventions 
(“projects”) and subsidies can make big and posi-
tive differences, especially in reaching underserved 
smallholders and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), but only if used strategically. They can also 
introduce major distortions.
• It is essential to view agriculture as a business, 
not a social sector; to treat farmers as businesses 
and customers, not as beneficiaries; and to focus 
v i i i  |  E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
more attention on the full value chain, on finance, 
on incentives, on the intermediation needed to 
bring innovation to scale, and on the enabling 
environment. 
• New partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives 
are essential for tackling scaling challenges. 
• Initiatives must go beyond being “policy takers” 
and play a much more proactive role in facilitating 
policy change that can be a scaling force multiplier.
• There is rarely a straight line or a short journey 
from research and innovation to validation and 
rollout. Adaptive management is an essential ingre-
dient in all successful scaling efforts.
• The actions of research institutions, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and other imple-
menting partners are shaped by donor policies, 
metrics, and procedures. Systemic change, there-
fore, needs to give special attention to changes 
in the funding priorities, internal incentives, 




Commercial flows far outstrip official development assis-
tance, and it has been estimated that for every dollar of 
official donor and philanthropic assistance to developing 
countries, those same countries now spend 35 of their own 
tax dollars.1 But there is increasing awareness that neither 
the private sector acting alone and in its own interests, nor 
governments continuing to do business as usual, will be 
sufficient to solve some of the world’s most vexing develop-
ment challenges.
Confronted with these realities, the development com-
munity is increasingly acknowledging that new types of 
partnerships are needed, and that new technologies and 
development interventions are likely to be material if and 
only if they are designed and managed in ways that have 
lasting effects on the incentives, policies, and practices of 
governments and businesses.
There is much work to be done in systematizing 
approaches to scaling and incorporating increased atten-
tion to the nontechnological forces that support—or 
challenge—scaling efforts. Just as was done with topics 
like monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and gender, this 
work includes assembling useful tools, approaches, and 
relevant experience, and mobilizing cadres of profession-
als—researchers, businesspeople, donors, and host govern-
ment officials—who are comfortable using and building 
on those advances.
The global conversation about reaching and sustaining 
scale has been slow to infuse the discourse about agricul-
tural development and food security. To bring these issues 
to the forefront, Purdue University, in partnership with 
the African Development Bank, organized a conference in 
September 2018 on Innovations in Agriculture: Scaling Up to 
Reach Millions. This Sourcebook is informed and inspired by 
that conference, which, we believe, was an inflection point 
in efforts to harness innovation for the benefit of those 
who need it most.
The Sourcebook is intended as a consolidated refer-
ence and a foundation for future discussions about scaling 
agricultural interventions and innovations. The Sourcebook 
suggests practical guidance for addressing each of the major 
scaling considerations emphasized at the conference (Intro 
Figure 1). While directed primarily to the agricultural sec-
tor, the document should also be relevant for those work-
ing on scaling development outcomes through commercial 
pathways in other sectors.
The publication benefited greatly from the guidance 
and project management provided by Suzanne Nielsen 
of Purdue University and from thoughtful review and 
substantive recommendations provided by the following 
individuals: Shaun Ferris (Catholic Relief Services), Mark 
Huisenga (United States Agency for International Devel-
opment, USAID), Johannes Linn (Brookings Institution), 
Maria Elena Mangiafico (International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development, IFAD), Marc Schut (International Insti-
tute of Tropical Agriculture, IITA), Simon Winter (Syngenta 
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, SFSA), Lennart 
Woltering (International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center, CIMMYT), and Carolyn Woo (Purdue University). 
Materials from the Purdue conference can be found 
at https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/scaleup/, including video 
Intro Figure 1. Word cloud based on responses by Scale Up Con-
ference attendees to the question, “What one word do you think 
describes the biggest challenge for successful scale up of agri-
cultural technologies/innovations in developing countries?”
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presentations from the conference, the complete set of 
PowerPoint presentations, case study abstracts, and poster 
abstracts. These materials and subsequent contributions will 
be permanently hosted by the Community of Practice on 
Scaling Development Outcomes (see Chapter 9 for details). 
Should readers have additional questions or be interested in 
joining the Community of Practice, they are invited to reach 
out to Larry Cooley, the principal author of this Sourcebook 
and co-curator (with Johannes Linn) of the Community of 
Practice, at lcooley@msi-inc.com.
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Designing Projects and Innovations 
with Scale in Mind
Big problems demand big solutions, but too often entre-
preneurs and development agencies find themselves 
inventing, prototyping, and making modest investments in 
promising technologies with no scaling strategy beyond a 
hope that the best of these technologies will somehow find 
their way to scale. On occasion, that strategy works, but 
not often enough, with estimates that less than 5% of pilot 
projects ever reach national scale.2
A growing body of experience suggests that it is pos-
sible to do much better by following a few rules for design-
ing interventions, innovations, and technologies with scale 
in mind.3
Scaling, as used here, is defined as “expanding, adapting 
and sustaining successful interventions (policies, processes, 
programs or projects) in different places and over time to 
reach a greater number of people.”4 More specifically, we are 
focusing on what some call “population-level” scale where 
the reach of the intervention (the “numerator,” e.g., reduced 
stunting of 5,000 children under the age of 5) must be eval-
uated in the context of the size of the problem or aspiration 
(the “denominator,” e.g., a national aim of reducing stunt-
ing for 1 million children under the age of 5). 
Projects focused on limited populations or proof of 
concept are useful, particularly when they explicitly address 
unanswered questions of key stakeholders and provide the 
evidence needed to guide adaptation, simplification, and 
advocacy. But too frequently, projects focus on perfecting 
an innovation within a small, controlled setting rather 
than on beginning with a vision of system-wide change 
and how the project will help to get us there, as depicted 
in Figure 1.1. Without that, “pilot project” is just a syn-
onym for “small project” and research is likely to result in 
“miracles on the shelf.”
In agriculture, there are only two platforms able to 
reliably deliver goods, services, and technologies at popu-
lation scale—governments and businesses, or a hybrid of 
both. Unlike projects and donors, these two platforms are 
predicated on operating at scale—delivering services at 
“population level” in the case of governments, and reach-
ing the “addressable market” in the case of businesses—
and are intended to sustain delivery of goods and services 
over time. Scale and sustainability are part of their DNA. 
Projects are, by contrast, designed to achieve discrete objec-
tives over a fixed period of time, usually for a limited num-
ber of direct beneficiaries. Simply put, if an agricultural 
project or innovation has no strategy for catalyzing a 
lasting change in market conditions and/or government 
services, it has no plan for achieving and sustaining out-
comes at scale. 
While it is impractical and wrong-headed to assume 
that every intervention should be scaled or that everyone 
should become a scaling expert, a serious focus on scaling 
has implications throughout the research-to-results con-
tinuum. At a minimum, integrating a focus on scale into 
agricultural research investments, prototypes, and pilot 
Figure 1.1. Projects as Instruments of Change
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projects includes thinking through a plausible pathway 
to scale and designing the initial project or prototype to 
advance that strategy by:
• Ensuring that the research/pilot/prototype gener-
ates evidence for advocacy, simplification, and 
tailoring of the intervention; 
• Identifying, involving, and working with the 
intended large-scale implementers through multi-
stakeholder initiatives; 
• Focusing early on unit cost and implications of the 
proposed change for existing businesses and cur-
rent service providers; and
• Allowing for frequent adaptation and adjustment 
based on market and client feedback.
There are several frameworks that can be used for 
planning a pathway to scale and for assessing scalability. 
One widely used framework consists of three steps and a 
total of 10 tasks essential for planning and achieving scale 
(Figure 1.2).5
This framework and others support scaling by detailing 
the actions required for successful scaling, and by distin-
guishing a range of scaling strategies and their operational 
implications. The analysis is elaborated in a separate pub-
lication that clarifies the considerations and implications 
of pursuing scaling objectives in agriculture through com-
mercial pathways.6
The following seven procedural guidelines or admo-
nitions derived from these works have been shown to 
enhance the scaling prospects of interventions and innova-
tions that benefit the rural poor (i.e., “pro-poor” agricul-
tural solutions).7
Guideline #1: Technological innovation is only one 
part of the challenge. Focusing on supply chains, the busi-
ness case, and the incentives for key players; overcoming 
skepticism; strengthening key institutions and financing 
mechanisms; and minimizing transition costs, are essential. 
Guideline #2: Focus early on scale and on what’s 
“beyond the project.” The linear approach of focusing 
first on effectiveness, then on efficiency, and finally on 
expansion will not work. By the time attention turns to 
Figure 1.2. A Three-Step, 10-Task Management Framework for Scaling
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expansion, the innovation will likely be too complicated 
or too expensive to scale, or it will be insufficiently attuned 
to other market realities. Although it is challenging to do 
so, early-stage innovators need to have one foot on the 
accelerator at the same time as they have the other foot on 
the brake—laying the groundwork for scaling while reserv-
ing judgment as to whether scaling is warranted.8 And 
project designers and implementers need to plan from the 
beginning for “What happens beyond the project or pilot 
if it works?”
Since a principal role of pilot and demonstration proj-
ects is to generate the evidence, learning, and communica-
tion needed to make these kinds of decisions, a good rule 
of thumb for pilot or R&D projects is to budget 20% of 
total costs for these functions rather than the 5% typically 
earmarked for monitoring and evaluation in conventional 
development projects (see Chapter 6 for more on this topic).
Guideline #3: Think subtraction, not addition. As 
you develop and refine an innovation, do not just think 
about how to make it better; think at every stage about how 
to make it simpler, cheaper, and more compatible with the 
procedures and incentives of the provider you hope will 
deliver it at scale.
Guideline #4: Link scale and sustainability. “Sus-
tainability”—the continuation of services and outcomes 
over time—should be inextricably linked to the concept of 
scale. Every time a project discusses scale, someone should 
ask, “Yes, but is it sustainable?” Every time a project dis-
cusses sustainability, someone should ask, “Yes, but at what 
scale?”
Guideline #5: Expect and plan for iteration. The path-
way from innovation to scale, even when successful, takes an 
average of 15 years9 and involves multiple changes in inter-
vention design and scaling strategy along the way. A capac-
ity for course correction is typically more important than a 
perfect plan. This puts a premium on establishing monitor-
ing and evaluation (M&E) systems designed to inform these 
changes and negotiating as much flexibility as possible with 
funders and partners. (See Chapter 6 for more.)
Guideline #6: Prioritize intermediation. Scaling pro-
poor agricultural solutions requires a wide range of support-
ing activities. Included in this “intermediation” are functions 
such as convening key stakeholders, investment packaging, 
syndication, and garnering support for policy change. In 
high-end commercial markets (including high-margin mar-
kets in low-income countries, as discussed in Chapter 3), 
these functions are performed by venture capitalists, invest-
ment bankers, and specialized consultants. At the bottom of 
the pyramid, these functions often fall between the cracks. 
When designing projects and interventions aimed at scaling 
for these markets, designers and funders, as part of their due 
diligence, need to take special care to ensure that capacity 
and funding exist to perform these functions (see Chapter 7 
for more on this topic). 
Guideline #7: Someone has to drive. Scaling of pro-
poor outcomes almost never occurs spontaneously, and it 
will rarely succeed without the determined leadership of 
people who are able to garner substantial resources and 
support, are deeply committed to the change, and are will-
ing to stick with the effort over time. But change can begin 
anywhere and is more likely if everyone has an eye on scale 
from the outset. While it may be unrealistic, for example, 
to expect innovators and researchers to drive change from 
their labs or workshops, their focus on workable solu-
tions to real problems and on plausible pathways to scale 
can be an essential ingredient in turning aspirations into 
outcomes. 
One way of increasing attention to the array of scaling 
considerations noted in this chapter is by incorporating a 
scaling plan as a component of—or companion to—project 
and grant proposals. Rather than focusing on an interven-
tion’s technical theory of change (i.e., how the intervention 
or innovation is expected to work), these plans highlight 
how the project is expected to lead to change in the larger 
system—what some have termed a “second theory of 
change” or “theory of scaling.”10 See Management System 
International’s (MSI) guidelines for one suggested format 
for scaling plans,11 available at http://tinyurl.com/yxt6wen9.
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Assessing Scalability
As noted in Chapter 1, assessing the potential for reaching 
and delivering at scale is hard-wired into the business mod-
els and incentives of private companies and government 
service agencies, both of which are motivated to operate 
at a scale dictated by the size of the need or market, and to 
satisfy those needs over the long run. This is quite different 
from the incentives and business models of organizations 
that fund or implement activities on a project basis and 
that, therefore, are focused from the outset on defined tar-
gets and deliverables, fixed implementation periods, and 
clear exit strategies. For most project-based organizations, 
adopting a scaling mentality thus requires major shifts in 
organizational systems, procedures, incentives, and mind-
sets. Often this change begins by institutionalizing some 
kind of “scaling scan,” “scaling readiness,” or “scalability 
assessment” at the project or transaction level.
The purpose of “scalability assessment” is to identify as 
early as possible the upside prospects and likely challenges 
that will be faced in scaling a specific service, innovation, 
approach, or product. Doing this systematically allows 
everyone involved to make informed decisions about 
whether and how to proceed, and to take specific steps to 
mitigate potential scaling obstacles.
Analyzing scalability requires careful analysis of four 
interlocking elements: (1) characteristics of the innovation 
or intervention; (2) characteristics of the organization(s) 
that would deliver it at scale and that would support the 
scaling effort; (3) characteristics of the prevailing policy 
regime and other enabling or constraining conditions; and 
(4) contextual factors such as the homogeneity or diversity 
of potential adopters ( Figure 2.1).12
Some of the first efforts to address scalability used cost-
benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis as principal tools.13 
More recently, there have been several efforts to formalize 
the process of scalability assessment and, subsequently, to 
adapt and apply systematic scalability assessment to pro-
poor agricultural interventions and innovations.
Typical of these efforts is a 32-item scalability assess-
ment checklist,14 available at http://tinyurl.com/yxlqgmfd, 
that has been applied as a decision-support and planning 
tool in a variety of sectors and countries since 2006. That 
checklist was recently adapted and elaborated for appli-
cation to pro-poor agricultural innovation. The adapted 
instrument, the Agricultural Scalability Assessment Tool 
(ASAT),15 available at https://bit.ly/2UaZ1B5, includes 37 
factors related to (1) the importance of the innovation; (2) 
its credibility and observability; (3) the ease with which 
it can be tried, purchased, adopted, and implemented by 
potential adopters; (4) the benefits and business case for 
potential adopters; (5) the business case for other supply 
chain actors and the strength of the underlying market sys-
tem; and (6) the enabling environment.16
Given the subjective nature of some of its elements, the 
ASAT is most useful when applied by diverse stakeholders 
in a facilitated process. Since each of the 37 factors in the 
Figure 2.1. Four Dimensions of Scalability Assessment
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index can be addressed through policy or programmatic 
actions, the tool is more appropriately used as a basis for 
modifying or adjusting scaling strategies than as a “score-
card” for determining the feasibility of an intervention or 
innovation reaching scale.
A second tool emerging from USAID–sponsored 
research is a “decision tree” intended to assess the feasi-
bility and suitability of private sector, public sector, and 
hybrid scaling pathways for each of six key functions 
involved in scaling agriculture, namely: production, distri-
bution, incentives, demand creation, training/support, and 
overall leadership of the scaling process.17
In search of a simple-to-apply method of assessing 
scalability, the CIMMYT collaborated with the Nether-
lands Development Organization (SNV) to develop a tool 
intended to help researchers and project leaders conduct 
self-assessments of their scaling plans, aspirations, and 
prospects—what the authors term a “scalability scan.” Like 
the ASAT, this tool is designed to be used in a moderated 
workshop setting. Users are guided through three steps: (1) 
construct your scaling ambition; (2) assess scaling ingre-
dients; and (3) list and respond to critical concerns. Step 
2, the scaling assessment, is organized around 10 “scaling 
ingredients” as shown in Figure 2.2.18
With similar aspirations, Wageningen University and the 
IITA have developed a methodology called “Scaling Readi-
ness.” Building on a NASA framework for assessing Technol-
ogy Readiness,19 Scaling Readiness was developed under the 
CGIAR (Consortium of International Agricultural Research 
Centers) Research Program on Roots, Tubers and Bananas. 
It uses scientifically based methods and tools to (1) char-
acterize and unpack agricultural innovations, (2) diagnose 
the readiness of the innovation to scale, (3) develop scaling 
strategies, (4) support stakeholder selection and action to 
overcome bottlenecks to scaling, and (5) navigate whether 
investments have resulted in the desired effect through mon-
itoring, evaluation, and learning. Scaling Readiness has been 
used by research, development, and donor organizations in 
12 countries.20
Other recent contributions on scalability assessment 
include a book by the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) on the science of scaling, Ann Mei Chang’s 
book Lean Impact, and a publication by Lennart Woltering 
and colleagues on the “scaling mindset.”21
A final noteworthy methodology comes from IFAD, 
which has been particularly ambitious in its efforts to inte-
grate scaling as a central element in all aspects of its opera-
tions. Building on a conceptual framework for scaling up 
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developed in partnership with the Brookings Institution 
(see Chapter 7), IFAD elaborated an Operational Framework 
for Scaling Up Results.22 The framework provides guidance 
on how to systematically consider scaling up in IFAD’s 
operations, from inception to completion, and in differ-
ent contexts. It suggests specific guiding questions for the 
different stages of the project cycle related to “Vision, Strat-
egy, and Implementing the Scaling Up Process” that probe 
threshold considerations on scaling.
This approach has been further adapted in an opera-
tional scaling assessment framework and toolkit devel-
oped under the auspices of the International Development 
Innovation Alliance (IDIA), a grouping of 12 major devel-
opment finance institutions focused on supporting innova-
tion for development impact at scale.23
A growing number of cases document the use of these 
various scalability assessment tools. Notable among these 
are five detailed case studies on market-based scaling of 
agricultural innovation,24 five applications of the ASAT,25 
four case studies of “scaling readiness,”26 and a variety of 
cases presented at the 2018 Purdue conference on scaling 
agricultural innovation.27
Box 2.1. Case Studies of Scaling 
Through Commercial Pathways
USAID’s Bureau for Food Security commissioned 
in-depth case studies of pro-poor agricultural 
innovations scaled through commercial path-
ways, including:
o Hybrid maize in Southern Zambia;
o Irrigated Sahel rice in the Senegal River 
Valley;
o Low-cost agricultural machinery in 
Southwest Bangladesh;
o Purdue Improved Crop Storage (PICS) 
bags in Kenya; and 
o Kuroiler chickens in Uganda.
The results—available in a series of case 
reports28 and synthesis documents29—contrib-
uted directly to the development of the Agri-
cultural Scalability Assessment Tool (ASAT30) and 
decision tree methodology presented in this 
Sourcebook.
Among many insights emerging from the cases are the 
following:
• There is no such thing as a fully “commercial” path-
way to scale; government policies, regulations, and 
subsidies play central roles in scaling all agricultural 
interventions.
• Successful commercial scaling requires forming 
partnerships that go well beyond the traditional 
concept of “implementing partners” to include key 
value chain actors such as equipment leasing, input 
provision, and product aggregation enterprises. 
• Scaling works best when changes are tangible, 
familiar, and easy to bundle and unbundle.
• Information technology has rapidly accelerated 
and fundamentally altered some pathways to scale. 
• The most vexing bottlenecks for scaling of innova-
tions are usually nontechnological in nature (e.g., 
access to markets, enabling policies, seed systems, 
access to finance).
• Poor farmers’ time horizons tend to be extremely 
short; they cannot afford a mistake and therefore 
tend to place a higher priority on minimizing risk 
than on maximizing reward. 
• Monopoly and/or monopsony are sometimes use-
ful in the short run to build effective and efficient 
supply chains, but often present challenges later.
• It is usually more effective for strategies and proj-
ects to avoid mandating the choice of local partners 
and prespecifying the sequencing of actions.
While the development and use of scalability assess-
ment tools for pro-poor agricultural interventions are still 
relatively new, there is a growing recognition that project 
planning and applied research design should both include 
some form of “scalability screen.” The tools noted above 
provide a foundation for that analysis and for deeper dis-
cussion among stakeholders on the most appropriate scal-
ing strategy to adopt.
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Using Commercial Markets to Drive Scaling
Because functioning markets are critical for creating popu-
lation-level impact, it is essential that researchers working 
on technological improvements engage with relevant pri-
vate entities at an early stage in the research process. These 
private sector representatives—small agribusinesses, coop-
eratives, input dealers, wholesalers, retailers, processors, 
equipment leasing firms, and food service companies—can 
provide timely feedback to steer the development of the 
technology, partner on demonstrations, and, once the tech-
nology is launched, play a critical role in sustainably scal-
ing technology adoption. 
The prevailing gulf between publicly financed research 
and markets is due partly to the fact that private sector 
investment in agriculture has been viewed with suspicion 
until recently in many low-income countries. Governments 
often assumed monopolistic roles for major inputs and 
commodities, cast as a protection for ordinary producers 
and consumers from market fluctuations and unscrupu-
lous private sector actors.
With the global debt crisis of the 1980s, many of these 
government interventions were no longer tenable. Struc-
tural adjustment lending programs were frequently con-
ditioned on government commitments to liberalize major 
markets, including agricultural markets. Donor agencies 
began to work with host country governments and pri-
vate sector investors to develop and strengthen agricultural 
value chains and markets, but rarely were these programs 
systematically linked to research and technology devel-
opment activities. In his keynote address31 at the Purdue 
conference, Akin Adesina recounted his excitement about 
bringing new high-yielding varieties of sorghum to farm-
ers as a postdoctoral researcher at the International Crops 
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). 
“But,” asked the farmers, “will ICRISAT buy the sorghum?” 
In other words—innovation is great, but where is the 
market? Technologies must be profitable, and there must 
be a buyer for the additional production.
A growing body of experience highlights the following 
four major insights regarding the role of markets to achieve 
scaling:
Address gaps in value chains to improve the econom-
ics of technology adoption. Several cases examined in a 
USAID-funded assessment of scaling through commercial 
markets feature examples of technologies that sat on a shelf 
for years because key parts of the value chains were missing. 
These include Senegal Sahel high-yielding irrigated rice vari-
eties that were introduced in the 1990s but did not take off 
until the 2010s, when they were included as part of donor- 
and government-supported value chain innovations to 
improve the production of certified quality rice seed; extend 
good agricultural practices; strengthen capacities to supply 
inputs, services, and downstream market linkages; and access 
finance.32 The critical role of government policies in facilitat-
ing Senegal rice adoption, including guaranteeing farmer 
prices above production costs, is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Similarly, PICS (Purdue Improved Crop Storage) 
technology, featuring triple-layer bags that provide a her-
metic seal against pests, was developed in the late 1980s 
in Cameroon through USAID-funded research.33 But PICS 
bags did not begin to scale until 2007, following an eco-
nomic analysis by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
that determined, because of the high cost of imported PICS 
bags, that developing local manufacturers and suppliers 
would be critical to bring down PICS bag costs and make 
their adoption more attractive. Today PICS bags are in use 
in more than 30 countries in Africa and Asia.
Focus on strengthening local capacity and companies 
to solve the “missing middle” problem. In low-income 
countries, there are large gaps in access to agricultural mar-
ket services. The small group of fully commercial farmers 
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are reached by the larger international and regional seed 
companies and machinery providers, for example, while 
the vast majority of semicommercial and subsistence farm-
ers largely rely on saved seed and operate with animal and 
people-powered equipment. 
Promising models to reach underserved farmers who 
are transitioning from subsistence to semicommercial farm-
ing focus on strengthening local companies and capacity. 
In the PICS case, filling the “missing middle” to improve 
smallholder access to better postharvest storage involved 
developing local manufacturing capacity, a dealership net-
work, and innovative marketing strategies for selling bags 
in small quantities. Local manufacturers of burlap bags 
and other woven products, for example Pee Pee Limited of 
Tanzania, were trained to manufacture a different, higher 
quality bag than the ones they were producing previously. 
Activities to incentivize the local manufacture of bags were 
combined with community-level demonstrations and 
innovative programs to generate demand and attract local 
vendors to sell the bags, including established agro-input 
shops, women, and youth.34
The Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS) of the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) worked 
to strengthen local research and seed value chain capacity 
at several levels. Critically, the PASS model focused not only 
on building the capacity of different value chain nodes, but 
also on purposefully linking the nodes. Efforts included 
building local university capacity to produce plant breed-
ers; developing the technical and managerial capacity of 
African seed companies from the “ground up” to produce 
high-quality seed at scale; facilitating links between breed-
ers and companies; and developing local seed marketing 
outlets close to farmers.35 
Seeds for Impact, a partnership between AGRA, the 
Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF), and Syngenta 
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture (SFSA), launched 
in late 2018, will leverage the progress by PASS and similar 
initiatives to provide small, growing seed companies with a 
mix of grants, loans, and technical assistance to scale faster.36
Both the PICS and PASS programs demonstrate that 
building local capacity is often a long, slow, and costly 
process. These efforts have been underway for well over a 
decade, a much longer timeframe than many project-based 
donors have been willing to support. Monitoring and 
evaluation efforts are usually focused on more immediate 
“outputs” rather than indicators of market development 
and sustainable impacts over a longer time horizon (see 
Chapter 6). Progress in developing local capacity may only 
manifest its full effects years after the project’s close. 
Increase smallholder access to markets and lower the 
costs of capital-intensive inputs and services by work-
ing through local service providers, franchise systems, 
and membership groups, and by harnessing technology. 
The comparatively large expense of agricultural machinery, 
especially for use on small tracts of land for limited periods 
of the year, combined with difficulties in accessing finance 
for fixed capital (see Chapter 4), has severely limited the 
adoption of agricultural mechanization by smallhold-
ers. In Bangladesh, the Cereal Systems Initiative for South 
Asia—Mechanization and Irrigation (CSISA-MI) project 
addressed this challenge by developing a model in which a 
local service provider (LSP) provides machinery services to 
the community. LSPs are key farmers with adequate capi-
tal, entrepreneurship, and business skills to buy a machine, 
which they use on their own land and then provide services 
for a fee to neighbors during the rest of the season.37
Babban Gona’s38 model in Nigeria and One Acre Fund39 
in East Africa both address economies of scale challenges 
by providing farmer members or franchisees with access to 
markets, negotiated prices, and technical advice. Hello Trac-
tor,40 operating in several African countries, has introduced 
an innovative “Uber for tractors” concept that uses informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICT) to connect farm 
machinery owners with smallholders desiring mechanized 
services. The objective is to increase the efficiency of machine 
use and reduce unit costs in order to facilitate much wider 
adoption of mechanization. Farmers can book services via 
an app or a local Hello Tractor agent. Requests are validated, 
aggregated geographically, and scheduled. Tractors are fitted 
with remote tracking devices so that Hello Tractor and tractor 
owners are able to track location and usage at all times.
Encourage private sector collaboration on exten-
sion. Private companies are embracing new functions to 
fill in missing pieces of the value chain, build a longer-
term relationship with customers, and ensure quality, often 
leveraging ICT. Over the years, funding for public extension 
services in low-income countries has declined, and local 
agro-dealers are beginning to step in to provide various 
services. These include organizing community-level dem-
onstration plots where farmers can see the impact of tech-
nologies close up. In Egypt, BASF created a mobile clinic, 
operating on market days, where farmers can bring their 
diseased plants and receive advice. BASF, Bayer, and oth-
ers also make extension advice available by phone through 
interactive voice messages or through Internet sites. Prod-
uct stickers on bags of fertilizer, seed, and chemicals pro-
vide phone or Internet contact information through which 
customers can check lot numbers and avoid fake products.
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Locating the Cases in  
the Scaling Framework 
Relating these case examples to the three-step scaling frame-
work described in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.2) raises critical strat-
egy, monitoring, policy, and timeframe questions related to 
Step 2 of the framework, Establishing the Preconditions for 
Scaling, and Step 3, Implementing the Scaling Up Process. 
Like many promising agricultural interventions and inno-
vations funded through projects, each of these cases struggled 
to carry out the foundational tasks included in Step 2 of the 
framework. But unlike most, each of these cases found a way 
to progress toward significant scale. Now, as each faces the 
operational tasks associated with Step 3, there are an array 
of new challenges relating to the development of profitable 
and competitive market solutions for the provision of inputs, 
equipment, and/or distribution and sales at scale (see below). 
Limitations regarding the financing of scale and the enabling 
environment for scaling are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Senegal Sahel rice and PICS bags are clearly in Step 3 
(Implementing the Scaling Up Process). Both initiatives have 
benefited from strong government and/or donor support 
for organizational innovations and coordination to connect 
smallholders to critical technologies and markets, and, in the 
case of PICS bags, to create local manufacturing capacity. Ques-
tions related to government support and the sustainability of 
Senegal Sahel rice adoption will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The spread of PICS bags appears to be more clearly on 
the path to sustainability over the long term without external 
support. Locally manufactured bags are generally lower cost 
and of competitive quality with imported competitors, and 
the private sector is continuing to evolve bag design and mar-
keting innovations with diminishing reliance on program 
support. However, as PICS bags become a dispersed private 
sector product rather than a project output, monitoring will 
become more difficult. Adoption rates, costs of manufacture 
and distribution, and determining the point at which popu-
lation-scale, sustained scaling is reached in a given country 
or region will be hard to determine, particularly if no specific 
external assessment efforts are put into place. 
PASS is in the latter stages of Step 2 (Establishing the 
Preconditions for Scaling) and appears to have achieved 
the desired result of committed adopters and resources 
allocated for going to scale. The nature and level of com-
petition in producing quality seed, and the ultimate scale 
potential of the effort, remain to be determined. PASS 
has now been folded into a new program, Partnership for 
Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa (PIATA). 
Tracking progress in Step 3 toward sustainable scaling will 
require monitoring PIATA as well as affiliated programs 
that build on PASS such as Seeds for Impact—in short, a 
much different approach to monitoring (see Chapter 6). 
Takeaways
Several key points emerge from this analysis with respect 
to the use of commercial markets to drive pro-poor scaling: 
• Government and/or donor action is often required 
to promote inclusive market development when the 
private sector is unwilling or unable to absorb the 
costs of reaching remote and dispersed smallholders. 
• Commercial markets are inherently volatile. In 
seeking scale, donors and governments should be 
sensitive to the risks faced by those who live on the 
margin, and seek measures to offset some of that 
risk without creating moral hazard. 
• Engaging with markets is critical for creating 
population-level impact, but most smallholders 
have limited access to reliable input or commod-
ity markets. Resources and patience are required to 
launch or strengthen local entities that can provide, 
and sustain, services to underserved rural areas. 
• Effective support for pro-poor agricultural inno-
vation often includes collaboration with, and 
assistance for, the nonfarming businesses and 
organizations, e.g., bag manufacturers and universi-
ties, that are vital to filling the gaps and developing 
viable agricultural value chains. 
• Working through local service providers, franchise 
and membership groups can help to aggregate 
demand and reduce the costs of providing capital-
intensive inputs and market services to remote 
smallholders. 
• There is considerable scope for local agro-input 
dealers and service providers to offer quality exten-
sion and product verification services to small-
holders to fill the gap left by diminished support 
for public extension. 
• Although often needed to jump-start change, sus-
tained public or external support also carries risks of 
dependence, or may inadvertently crowd out other 
private sector investors. Similarly, temporary monop-
olies are sometimes necessary to create investment 
incentives and economies of scale, but planning 
should include a strategy for encouraging competi-
tive markets over time at all stages of the value chain.
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Financing the Transition to Scale
Scaling impact in agriculture requires investment at scale, 
but where will the money come from? Commercial banks 
have been famously reluctant to lend to the sector. In 
Africa, an estimated 1% of commercial bank loans go to 
agriculture.41 Globally, the unmet demand for smallholder 
finance is estimated at $200 billion.42 A World Bank survey 
of commercial lending in Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, 
and Sierra Leone found that most lending for agribusiness 
was short-term and did not match borrower needs, particu-
larly investment capital requirements for farm machinery, 
nonfarm assets, and industrial property. Banks mainly 
financed off-farm value chain activities, including process-
ing and marketing, and avoided lending to smallholder 
farmers except where they were organized into cooperatives 
or producer organizations.43
Why Is Commercial Bank Lending 
to Small and Medium Enterprise 
(SME) Agribusiness so Low?
Commercial banks perceive agricultural value chain activities 
as relatively high risk, high cost, and low margin compared 
to other sectors. Production can be devastated by droughts, 
floods, pests, and diseases. Input and commodity markets 
can be affected by price volatility and logistics challenges. 
Legal issues, including land tenure and contract enforce-
ment, also add risk and costs. Providing financial services 
through regular brick and mortar banking facilities to widely 
dispersed farmers and agribusinesses is costly. In addition, 
banks often cite their lack of in-house technical expertise 
and inability to assess agriculture-related risks as a key rea-
son for the low level of finance to the sector. When com-
mercial bank financing is available, interest rates are often 
prohibitively high for smallholders and SME agribusinesses. 
To deal with the chronic lack of funding for agriculture 
from the commercial sector, the agriculture sector has tradi-
tionally turned to government for subsidies, and to donor 
and development finance institutions for investments in 
agricultural development projects. However, the level of 
public funding delivered through individual projects in this 
way has been inadequate to support scaling up, and public-
only financing is unsustainable over the long term.
The following sections review some of the emerging 
public and private sector innovations that are beginning to 
offset risks and increase financial flows to the agricultural 
sector from commercial banks and newer financial actors. 
The financing channels—by themselves or in different com-
binations as blended financing—offer funding, repayment 
terms that are tailored to specific situations, and, increas-
ingly, ongoing management and technical advice. 
The financial sector innovations described below are 
generally at the nascent stage. While there are an increasing 
number of examples on the ground, implementation and 
learning tend to be siloed, with limited resources for inno-
vation and few platforms for sharing across organizations. 
An exception and potential model is the Council on Small-
holder Agricultural Finance, an alliance of social lending 
institutions targeting “missing middle” agricultural busi-
nesses in low- and middle-income countries. Established in 
2012, the alliance provides a platform for members to con-
vene on a precompetitive basis to share learning, identify 
best practices, and develop industry standards related to 
market growth, responsible lending principles, and social 
and environmental impact.44 
Even the most innovative partnerships and mecha-
nisms, however, will be limited by the policies, regulations, 
and services provided by the government (see Chapter 5). 
These include contract enforcement, laws and regula-
tions affecting input and commodity trade, and policies 
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governing land tenure, as well as levels of corruption that 
can discourage private sector investment. 
In the early stages of developing an innovation and 
scaling pathway, lead scaling partners should review the 
landscape of financial partners and programs that have 
aligned interests and/or are already operating in the target 
region(s). Prospective financial partners for scaling should 
be engaged at an early stage—even if their funding is not 
needed until later—so that these partners can help to shape 
the program as it develops and ready it for larger financing 
streams.
The remainder of this chapter reviews a range of risk 
mitigation and capital mobilization mechanisms intended 
to increase the financing available to scale up pro-poor 
agricultural innovation. 
Risk Mitigation
Traditional loan collateral requirements, including land or 
building titles, are often difficult or impossible for small-
holders to obtain. Warehouse receipt systems (WRS) enable 
farmers and agribusinesses to use stored commodities in 
lieu of traditional collateral for finance. Long-established 
WRS exist in the United States, across Latin America and 
Western Europe, and in China, Vietnam, and the Philip-
pines. In WRS, the farmer deposits a quantity of agricul-
tural products in a licensed warehouse. The warehouse 
then issues a receipt that can be retained for later sale of 
the commodity or used as collateral for finance. 
Donor programs to help develop WRS and link their 
use to credit guarantee funds have expanded farmer access 
to financing in some countries,45, 46 but overall their use in 
low-income countries remains limited.47 While a number 
of countries have developed legislation that enables ware-
house receipts to be used as legal collateral, it has proved 
more difficult for low-income countries to meet broader 
system-level requirements, including a reliable network 
of licensed warehouses that are regularly inspected, com-
petently managed to maintain the quality of stored com-
modities, and insured.48
Traditional insurance. Agricultural insurance is used by 
producers and their financial partners to mitigate unpre-
ventable risks at the production level and throughout the 
value chain. Financial partners for scale up investments 
may require programs to acquire insurance against pro-
ducer risk as a prerequisite for financing approval, and/
or may seek additional insurance themselves. Agricultural 
insurance is common in industrialized countries, but its 
use in low-income countries remains low. A 2012 World 
Bank study found that only one-third of middle- and low-
income countries offer agricultural insurance products.49 
Even when such products are available, utilization may be 
low because of the expense or the lack of confidence by 
banks and farmers in the overall system.50
Index-based insurance. In recent years, the development 
of advanced agricultural risk modeling techniques and 
the emergence of insurance pools and index-based insur-
ance have sparked new interest in agricultural insurance. 
In contrast to traditional insurance, which assesses risks 
and claims on an individual basis, index-based insurance 
is based on measuring an objective parameter(s) that is 
highly correlated with actual losses sustained by farmers or 
herders.51 For example, the insurance payout scale may be 
agreed to in advance, based on rainfall levels recorded at 
a given weather station. In aggregate index insurance, the 
payouts are based on an index developed from aggregated 
statistics of farm production in a defined geographic area, 
for example, crop yield estimates.52
Index insurance has increased in popularity, and today 
tens of millions of farmers in India and a growing number 
of farmers and herders in Africa are thought to be insured 
through these programs.53 Their popularity is due in part 
to the potential to address systemic catastrophic risks, 
including widespread drought. Available evidence suggests 
that farming households with index insurance increase 
their investments in production and in some cases make 
riskier production choices, both critical to advance scaling 
of agricultural innovations.54 The International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) pioneered the adaptation of index 
insurance for livestock herders in drought-prone areas.55
However, a 2018 stock-taking study by ISF Advisors 
found that while index insurance shows great potential, it 
is not yet at a mature enough point for innovations to scale 
and graduate from donor assistance. There are issues to 
be overcome at different nodes: from smallholder farmers 
who have difficulty understanding, trusting, and affording 
products; to aggregators and intermediaries who lack experi-
ence and resources to deal with a range of complex tasks; 
to global reinsurers faced with a very small market; and to 
governments attempting to fit these products into broader 
national insurance policies and programs. The World Bank, 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and other 
development partners are focusing on the development of 
effective, sustainable markets for index-based weather and 
catastrophic risk insurance through the Global Index Insur-
ance Facility (GIIF).56 But there is a need for broader industry- 
wide collaboration and a platform similar to the Council 
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on Smallholder Agricultural Finance to facilitate ongoing 
innovation, testing and prototypes, improvements in the 
regulatory and enabling environment at national levels, and 
cross-organization sharing, learning, and investment.57
Credit guarantee funds, usually provided by governments 
or development organizations, make commercial lending 
more attractive by sharing or absorbing the risks of lending 
to the target sector, value chain, or enterprise type. Credit 
guarantees provided by the Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA), the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), the World Bank, and other partners 
have motivated local banks to make loans to agro-input deal-
ers, small-scale farmers, and other SMEs in several African 
countries. AGRA reports that $17 million in loan guarantees 
leveraged $160 million in low-interest loans from commer-
cial banks in five African countries.58 The Africa Guarantee 
Fund for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises,59 funded by 
the African Development Bank in partnership with Denmark 
and Spain, provides partial credit guarantees and funding to 
help financial institutions develop their capacity to manage 
SME portfolios. 
The Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for 
Agricultural Lending60 (NIRSAL), initiated by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria in 2011 with seed capital of USD $500 mil-
lion, is the largest government-run program of its kind in 
Africa. In addition to credit guarantees, NIRSAL provides 
insurance and technical assistance to banks with the objec-
tive of increasing commercial lending to agriculture from 
2% to 7% of the overall portfolio within 10 years. Between 
2012 and 2015, NIRSAL provided credit guarantees for more 
than 450 agricultural projects valued at $170 million.61
Innovative Finance 
Blended finance is the combination of funding from a range 
of capital providers (including, but not limited to, com-
mercial banks) with differing financial and social objec-
tives. Blended finance partners might include development 
agencies or other philanthropic funds anticipating a nega-
tive financial rate of return, and other funders seeking 
capital preservation, below-market, or market rate returns. 
Blended finance approaches are typically used to “attract 
capital for investments addressing market failures and 
delivering substantial social and/or environmental impact 
in emerging and frontier markets.”62
Blended finance mechanisms have become increas-
ingly popular and can provide important opportunities for 
scalable innovations to gain access to finance. According 
to a World Economic Forum survey of 74 blended finance 
vehicles, each dollar of grant funding invested typically 
attracts $1–20 in private investment.63 There are many 
types of blended finance instruments, often packaged in 
different ways to meet the requirements of a specific oppor-
tunity and group of investors. 
In structured finance agreements, public or philanthropic 
investors agree to absorb “first losses” to protect private 
investors in case the financed program fails to perform as 
expected and investors cannot be repaid. For example, in 
the Africa Agriculture Trade and Investment Fund (AATIF),64 
a $146 million fund that invests in African agriculture, the 
first two tiers of shareholders, the German Ministry of Devel-
opment and Deutsche Bank, agree to absorb losses before 
the third tier—composed of private investors—is hit. This 
means that losses would have to exceed 50 percent of the 
fund’s value before private investors were harmed.65 
Another example of structured finance comes from 
Root Capital, a social impact investor (see the following 
section) specializing in providing financial access to under-
served smallholders and SMEs in low-income countries.66 
In response to a devastating outbreak of coffee leaf rust 
affecting millions of coffee farmers in Latin America begin-
ning in 2012, Root Capital mobilized partners from across 
the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to co-design the 
Coffee Farmer Resilience Initiative (CFRI).67 CFRI is funded 
with a blend of below-market-rate capital, including low-
cost debt, catalytic credit enhancements, and grant fund-
ing. Several tiers of partners were recruited to support the 
program. The Ford Foundation, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank’s Multilateral Investment Fund (IDB-MIF), 
and Starbucks Coffee Company made long-term invest-
ments (7–10 years) of $12.5 million in Root Capital to 
support coffee farm renovation and rehabilitation-related 
lending. Keurig Green Mountain and USAID provided first-
loss capital and other forms of credit guarantees. 
USAID also provided an additional $2 million in grant 
funding under the Global Development Alliance to mobi-
lize funding and partnerships from several specialty pri-
vate sector roasters, who channeled funding for technical 
assistance to their suppliers to reach over 40,000 farmers. 
Support from other donors covered the costs of program 
design, financial management training, ICT activities, and 
impact assessment. 
Agribusiness investors and agricultural investment funds. 
Investments by foreign agribusiness firms in low-income 
country agricultural sectors provide important sources of 
finance as well as technical assistance. Governments and 
donor agencies often partner with multinational firms in 
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these investments to supplement resources for technical 
assistance and ensure greater inclusion of smallholders. 
Olam’s rice investment in Nasarawa State, Nigeria pro-
vides one example. Olam established Ondorie Nucleus 
Rice Farm, a 10,000-hectare irrigated rice farm, and a state-
of-the-art mechanized rice milling and parboiling facility 
with the capacity to process 105,000 MT rice/year. The rice 
is sourced from the nucleus farm and from smallholder 
outgrower networks in communities across three states. 
Farmers are being supported with group formation, train-
ing, and agricultural inputs on credit to improve their pro-
duction. They also benefit from a guaranteed buyer system. 
Grant and financing partners include the federal govern-
ment of Nigeria, the Commercial Bank of Nigeria, IFAD, 
and USAID/Nigeria.68 From a starting base of 30 farmers 
in 2015, the partnership by 2017 had expanded to nearly 
5,000 farmers. During this period Olam purchased over 
25,000 MT of rice from smallholders for $9.8 million. The 
partnership also created 3,800 off-farm value chain–related 
jobs, primarily for youth and women.69
The Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program (AMSAP) 
is another example of a public-private agribusiness invest-
ment, here including USAID, DuPont Pioneer (now Cor-
teva Agriscience), and the Government of Ethiopia. In 
AMSAP, USAID offered a dollar for dollar grant matching 
program that leveraged a $2 million contribution from 
DuPont. The program’s goal was to improve the yields, 
incomes, and nutritional outcomes of more than 100,000 
smallholder farmers across three regions of Ethiopia. ACDI/
VOCA provided technical assistance to develop demonstra-
tion plots and field training sessions, and strengthened a 
network of agro-input dealers and cooperatives to advance 
the adoption of improved inputs and production tech-
niques. By the end of 2016, two years before the program’s 
end, over 250,000 smallholders had adopted new technol-
ogy. Participating farmers achieved a threefold increase in 
maize yields and boosted their annual incomes by as much 
as $1,500.70, 71
Agricultural investment funds combine capital resources 
from different types of investors for on-lending to, or invest-
ment in, agricultural enterprises. Through these pooled 
resources, the funds offer diversified investments and vehi-
cles that help manage investors’ risks.72 The investment 
funds utilize a range of instruments to provide capital to 
agribusinesses, including equity, debt, and guarantees. They 
also provide specialized technical and management exper-
tise to support clients and improve investment performance. 
Many agribusiness investment funds were established 
as public-private partnerships with government agencies, 
sovereign wealth funds, and development finance institu-
tions (DFIs) as major investors. More recently, foundations, 
bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations have 
also entered partnerships with agricultural investment 
funds. The development partners are important because 
they provide direction to focus investments on lower-
income, harder to access farmers and SMEs. They also pro-
vide a source of patient capital, and sometimes separate 
grant funds for technical assistance, enabling fund invest-
ment managers to have greater flexibility in providing sup-
port to underserved clients. 
Social impact investments are made “with the intention 
to generate positive, measurable social and environmental 
impact alongside a financial return.”73 Targeting a range of 
returns from below market rate to market rate, social impact 
investments are typically made to address challenges in sec-
tors including agricultural development, renewable energy, 
microfinance, housing, health care, and education services. 
Social impact investing and enterprises represent a growing 
trend among donor agencies, multilateral organizations, 
and philanthropic funders to invest within the framework 
of a business model to ensure sustainability of results on 
the ground.
The Kenya certified potato seed program illustrates 
how social impact investing can be used to support scaling 
up of improved agricultural technology that has expected 
high social benefits over the long term but is not a good 
candidate for immediate commercial funding. Potato is 
a key cash and subsistence crop for 2.5 million Kenyan 
smallholders, but average yields of 7–8 tons per hectare 
are low compared to the potential 30 tons/ha, mainly due 
to the lack of quality disease-free seed of improved variet-
ies. A long-term partnership between donors, the CGIAR’s 
International Potato Center (CIP), SFSA, the Kenyan gov-
ernment, and the private sector made it possible to address 
this need in a systems context.74
CIP, with funding from USAID and the German Agency 
for International Cooperation (GIZ), developed a “3G” 
approach and technologies that significantly reduced the 
time and cost to produce certified, disease-free seed pota-
toes.75 The CIP 3G advance made it more attractive for the 
private sector to expand potato seed production in Kenya. 
SFSA subsequently assisted one of the original 3G pri-
vate sector potato seed multipliers (Kisima Farm), begin-
ning in 2011, to expand its production base from 10 to 
100 hectares in 2018, with most potato seed sold locally 
to smallholder farmers. Kisima Farm’s seed potato produc-
tion now exceeds the total seed production output of the 
Kenyan public sector. SFSA assistance included technical 
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consulting for seed production and support for training 
local potato growers. To complement the improved vari-
eties available through CIP, SFSA also brokered a success-
ful alliance with a Dutch private breeder (HZPC) to allow 
Kisima to commercially produce seed of modern process-
ing varieties in Kenya in return for a royalty payment. In 
addition, SFSA co-funded a USD $1.1 million investment 
by the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) to con-
struct a 1,000-ton cold store and additional facilities with 
Kisima Farm, which later self-funded a further doubling 
of their cold store capacity. A survey of local smallholder 
farmers credited the new and improved potato seed with 
increasing yields up to tenfold.76 However, despite the suc-
cesses of Kisima and four other similar potato seed busi-
nesses, their combined potato seed production capacity 
still reaches only an estimated 10% of the local market.77
Babban Gona,78 which means “great farm” in Nige-
ria’s Hausa language, works through a network of franchise 
farmer groups to provide services to large numbers of widely 
dispersed smallholders. The program has disbursed 16,000 
small, 2-year loans ($600/client on average). With a repay-
ment rate of 99%, Babban Gona has been able to attract 
commercial investors who do not ordinarily invest in the 
agricultural sector. Franchise group members are provided 
with the correct mix of agricultural inputs and application 
services and, through their groups, can access good ware-
housing, commodity markets, and negotiated, fair prices.79
The organization has developed a blended capital 
structure to raise funds by leveraging debt from domestic 
and international social investors to de-risk and “crowd in” 
low-cost commercial capital. By 2018, Babban Gona had 
raised approximately $30 million in debt and equity, with 
a further pipeline of $30 million anticipated.80
One Acre Fund (OAF) is a nonprofit social enterprise 
that generates earned revenue to maintain its core programs 
and solicits donor funding to support program expansion 
and innovation across different countries. OAF began work-
ing with 120 smallholder farm families in western Kenya 
in 2006, and by 2018 had expanded to serve 809,000 farm 
families in six countries of Southern and Eastern Africa81 
across Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Uganda, and Tan-
zania. Like Babban Gona, One Acre Fund has developed a 
scalable model built around farmer groups and offers several 
services. The program offers financing for agricultural inputs, 
including hybrid seed and fertilizer, to farmer-organized 
groups that are jointly liable for loan repayment by harvest 
time. These inputs are distributed for collection within walk-
ing distance of farmers’ homes. OAF also provides interac-
tive, in-person training on topics throughout the season 
such as fertilizer application, planting in rows, and other 
agricultural  methods. In addition, the program assists farm-
ers in marketing their crops (in contrast to Babban Gona, 
which buys commodities directly from farmers), including 
training on safe storage so that farmers are able to wait to 
sell in order to maximize their profits. OAF programs have 
farmer loan repayment rates of 99%.82, 83
Babban Gona and One Acre Fund both appear to have 
moved into Step 3 of the scaling framework (Figure 1.2), 
but it is too soon to judge the eventual scale of either. 
Both cases have raised some questions about whether their 
access to larger amounts of capital at lower interest rates 
and domination of local input and commodity markets 
may discourage investments by more local private sector 
competitors. The models are very promising, but much will 
depend on the appetite of investors to sustain them over 
the long term, and their longer-term impact on the shape 
of rural market services. 
Takeaways
Scaling pro-poor agricultural innovation will be possible 
only if means can be found to scale the availability of 
the finance needed to fuel such change. And that gap is 
unlikely to be significantly diminished without reducing 
the risk, perceived risk, or transaction costs associated with 
investment in pro-poor agriculture. For now, the $200 bil-
lion of unfunded need remains a yawning chasm. 
While we cite in this chapter some promising exam-
ples of potentially scalable financing mechanisms and an 
increasing array of new financial innovations from which 
to learn, the fact remains that virtually all of the finance 
approaches—ranging from index insurance to social impact 
investing partnerships—are relatively modest in size and at 
an early stage in their application to pro-poor agriculture. 
Testing, stretching, and adapting mechanisms such as those 
noted in this chapter, so that they can meet the needs of 
millions of farm and SME families, should occupy a central 
place in the action and learning agendas of official donors, 
governments, philanthropists, and scholars.
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Creating an Enabling Environment 
for Scale—Partnerships, Policy, 
Behavioral Change, and Institutions
As the scalability assessment tools highlighted in Chapter 
2 make clear, many of the factors most central to scaling 
are not under the direct control of project implementers or 
donors. They are characteristics of the settings and arrange-
ments within which these interventions occur. But that 
doesn’t mean intervenors should accept these conditions 
passively. Rather, it is a call to action for ways in which 
intervenors can marshal the evidence and build the coali-
tions needed to make fundamental and lasting change.
The enabling environment for scaling includes fac-
tors that are internal to the implementer or funder (e.g., 
institutional incentives for scaling) or external (e.g., in the 
ecosystem). Enabling conditions may include existing, pos-
itive “drivers” of the scaling process, and factors that cur-
rently present “barriers” to scaling but that, if altered, may 
themselves become positive drivers. Among the enabling 
environment components highlighted during the Purdue 
conference were partnerships, policy, behavioral change, 
and institutions.84
Partnerships
Partnerships are the beating heart of successful, sustainable 
scaling efforts. Recognizing the different strengths, objec-
tives, and ways of operating that various partners bring to 
the table, and finding common ground, is fundamental. 
Mutual trust, transparency, ongoing dialogue, and a will-
ingness to adapt are important in building partnerships 
among organizations with very different strengths. 
Evidence from recent cases suggests that there is much 
to be gained by critically rethinking the role of private sec-
tor partners and the role of donors in facilitating effective 
and sustainable partnerships. An illustrative example is the 
Cereal Systems Initiative for South Asia— Mechanization 
and Irrigation (CSISA-MI) project in Bangladesh, co-
designed by CIMMYT, an international research organiza-
tion, and iDE, an organization specializing in commercial 
market development. 
The project goal was to expand the use of small mecha-
nized seeders, reapers, and high-volume irrigation pumps 
by smallholder families to alleviate a severe labor con-
straint. CIMMYT knew what technologies were needed, 
and where, to improve smallholder productivity and effi-
ciency; and iDE brought its expertise in business and mar-
ket development, enabling it to source machinery from 
agro-industry and develop networks of micro-entrepre-
neurs to bring the machinery and services close to farm-
ers. Critical to this partnership and successful scaling effort 
were the commitment to using a market approach and 
adapting the project in response to market feedback. This 
included CIMMYT’s willingness to pivot on which crops, 
machines, farmers, and locations to target, despite its orga-
nizational commitment to supporting wheat, maize, and 
cereals.85
Intermediary organizations (see Chapter 7) can play a 
key role in facilitating strategic partnerships for scaling—
a role that is usually underrecognized and underfunded. 
Financial organizations—NGOs and for-profits—are 
increasingly playing this role in low-income countries. 
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For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, Root Capi-
tal mobilized the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to 
co-design the Coffee Farmer Resilience Initiative (CFRI), 
illustrating how blended finance and social impact invest-
ment can help bring together partners with different 
motivations to solve a complex financing and technical 
assistance problem. In CFRI, the objectives of the involved 
public sector institutions were to improve incomes and 
food security while addressing systemic issues, includ-
ing conflict, migration, and deforestation. Private sector 
partners needed a reliable supply of high-quality coffee 
and, for purposes of corporate social responsibility, also 
wanted to advance economic development and environ-
mental sustainability in the communities where they 
worked. Philanthropic partners sought to develop new 
cross-sector models where their funding could be used to 
unlock additional resources from other private and public 
sector partners.86
CFRI also illustrates the practical difficulties of imple-
menting a partnership, and the key role of intermediaries 
in pulling together all the pieces. Both USAID and IDB-MIF 
wanted to partner with global coffee buyers to ensure the 
sustainability of the program, but the private sector had to 
co-invest so that public monies would not directly subsi-
dize private supply chains, and public monies had to be 
used where development needs were greatest. While pri-
vate companies wanted to support activities in their own 
supply chains, they were reluctant to pool funds to address 
an industry-wide problem. As intermediaries, Root Capital 
and CFRI were able to direct corporate investments to their 
specific supply chains and use grant funding to address 
needs in underserved areas.87
Partnership selection should be part of a stepwise 
approach of characterizing innovations, diagnosing their 
readiness to scale, developing strategies to overcome scal-
ing bottlenecks, and subsequently agreeing on which part-
ners and partnership process can effectively address the 
bottlenecks.88
A key premise for partner selection should be a shared 
vision of delivery at scale and of the partners best equipped 
to overcome specific scaling bottlenecks. This is in stark 
contrast to the common practice of defaulting to the most 
familiar partners regardless of the scaling context. It is 
likely, for example, that partners for doing field demon-
strations (e.g., a national NGO) will be very different from 
partners that can provide access to finance at scale (e.g., 
commercial banks).89 Likewise, it is likely that the best part-
ners for long-term delivery may be unaccustomed to work-
ing on short-term donor-funded projects. 
Policy Environment 
In his remarks to the Purdue Scale Up Conference, Akin 
Adesina cast policy as one side of a “scaling up triangle”—
science and technology, political will, and policy and incen-
tives.90 The government plays an essential role in regulating 
access to core factors of production, including land, and in 
providing services such as seed certification and trade regu-
lation. Policies and programs, including smart subsidies, 
can play a major role in driving scaling and creating an 
enabling environment for scaling agricultural innovations; 
but any subsidies, if not well targeted, can also create signif-
icant distortions. Ensuring that proposed interventions are 
aligned with government priorities, and early outreach to 
build relationships with public sector agriculture officials, 
increase the prospects for helpful synergies and openings 
for discussions about how to address policy constraints. 
Also speaking at the Purdue conference, David Spiel-
man91 of the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) suggested that those interested in addressing policy 
shortfalls and scaling innovation need to become policy 
“makers” rather than policy “takers” by seeking to influence 
the influencers. He noted the need to go beyond evidence 
and data analysis, which by themselves do not actually 
change policy. Spielman called for an increased focus on 
evidence-based advocacy and communication to accelerate 
policy changes that matter for scaling innovations. 
As the scaling framework presented in Chapter 1 sug-
gests, third parties can play a role in facilitating and sup-
porting policy change. Key functions involve developing 
and socializing solid evidence, identifying and supporting 
champions of change, building the capacity of key agen-
cies, and providing bridge funding for the transition from 
one policy regime to another. Projects can be used to high-
light policy constraints that limit scaling and to build the 
evidence supporting change; but they can also be used to 
help build the constituencies, coalitions, and strategies for 
advancing that change.
One example of proactive work to support policy 
change comes from Rwanda, where HarvestPlus began to 
engage high-level government officials prior to the release 
of biofortified iron-rich bean varieties. This early outreach 
helped to integrate the production and consumption of 
biofortified crops into national policies. The National 
Food and Nutrition Policy highlights biofortified crops as 
a strategy to improve nutrition in the country, and the Stra-
tegic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda 
recognizes consumption of legumes, such as iron beans, 
as critical for improved nutrition. HarvestPlus established 
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a close relationship with the Rwanda Agriculture Board, 
which helped to quickly scale up biofortified bean pro-
duction; and linkages created with the Ministry of Health, 
through participation in the joint nutrition taskforce, built 
stronger nutrition messaging, including the promotion of 
iron bean varieties by community health clinics.92
Government policies and program interventions can 
significantly affect both demand and supply factors that 
have a direct bearing on the spread of innovations. Senegal, 
heavily reliant on imported Asian rice for its main staple 
food, was severely affected by the 2007/2008 global food 
price crisis. The price of rice rose by more than 100%.93 
Subsequently, the government of Senegal introduced a 
policy of rice self-sufficiency and a comprehensive package 
of subsidies to support irrigated rice sector development. 
These incentives included setting prices paid to farmers 
well above their production costs, making direct purchases 
of rice, improving irrigation and road infrastructure, and 
subsidizing inputs, credit, insurance, and purchases of 
machinery. Rice importers were also required to purchase 
amounts of domestic rice in direct proportion to their 
imports, guaranteeing a market for domestic rice.
The use of public subsidies to promote agricultural 
development in low-income countries has been debated 
numerous times over the years, but, as Akin Adesina and 
other participants at the Purdue conference pointed out, 
the United States and the European Union both heavily 
subsidize their agricultural sectors, and without subsidies 
India would not have achieved the Green Revolution. Sub-
sidies can be misused, but the challenge, Adesina said, is to 
target these subsidies more effectively and to create better 
and more transparent ways of delivering them. 
The heavy government intervention in the case of Sene-
gal appears to have helped “crowd in” private sector invest-
ment by significantly reducing risks. Overall, the package 
of policies and programs greatly facilitated the adoption 
of irrigated rice innovations promoted by the USAID-
funded Projet Croissance Economique (PCE), even as they 
clearly distorted parts of the value chain, especially for 
wholesalers and retailers.94 A recent cost-benefit analysis 
found that PCE, government, and other donor programs 
significantly improved the productivity of the irrigated rice 
value chain since 2012. Even accounting for government 
subsidies and donor support, economic benefits outweigh 
the costs. However, the analysis raises concerns about 
long-term sustainability. The economic rate of return was 
found to be only marginally above the discount rate, indi-
cating the importance of an exit strategy for government 
and donor programs, while also noting that the removal 
of subsidies “could result in adverse effects throughout 
the value chain.”95 Rice is an internationally traded good. 
There are questions about whether Senegal, particularly 
its smallholders, will be able to successfully compete with 
lower-cost international competitors (many of whom 
themselves benefit from government subsidy programs) 
over the longer term, even with improved technologies and 
preferred access to the domestic market.
Similarly, the Nigerian government has long sought to 
expand the cultivation of cassava to boost its domestic agri-
culture sector, improve smallholder incomes, and reduce 
the country’s reliance on imported wheat and rice. Cassava 
spoils easily and must be gathered and quickly processed 
after harvest. Over the years, the Nigerian government has 
introduced a range of policies and programs to boost pro-
duction and demand for cassava products, including tariffs 
on wheat importation and requiring bakers to incorporate 
a percentage of high-quality cassava flour into their goods.96 
These and other incentives to further develop the value 
chain have facilitated the widespread adoption of high-
yielding cassava varieties and the expansion of production 
from about 12 million metric tons in the late 1980s to over 
50 million metric tons in 2011.97
Transferring the delivery of subsidies from the pub-
lic sector to the private sector, and adding technology, is 
helping to improve efficiency and deter corruption. In 
Nigeria, nearly $5 billion in fertilizer subsidies intended 
to support greater agricultural productivity are estimated 
to have been diverted through corruption.98 Some states 
have responded by removing the public sector from direct 
procurement and distribution of fertilizer, and by develop-
ing systems that allow farmers to use mobile phones and 
smart vouchers to buy fertilizer directly from local private 
agro-dealers. 
Government agencies also provide essential regula-
tory and oversight services for scalable innovations. It is 
important for scaling partners to understand the process 
and get an early start on addressing requirements. Kenya 
has a highly regarded plant health safety inspection system, 
for example, but it can still take several years to register 
new seed varieties, even when those varieties are already 
available in neighboring countries. Some countries, includ-
ing Zambia, are now allowing private sector companies 
to undertake inspection services to speed up the process, 
shifting the state’s role from direct service provision to 
oversight.99
An important scaling consideration is whether new 
innovations will have access to regional markets. In sub-
Saharan Africa, regional economic communities (ECOWAS, 
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COMESA, EAC, SADC) have developed frameworks for 
harmonizing seed variety release, registration, certification, 
and sanitary and phytosanitary review, but implementing 
the frameworks will require changes at the national level—
legislation or regulation—in order to take effect.100
Data and technology are increasingly being used to 
improve the efficiency of systems that were formerly dom-
inated by the public sector. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, index-based insurance has created new interest 
and markets for agricultural insurance. The use of data and 
advanced modeling has effectively removed the need for 
the cumbersome, expensive, and corruption-prone process 
of assessing risks and claims on an individual basis. Other 
new tools, including test kits, scratch cards with lot num-
bers, and telephone help lines, allow consumers to easily 
verify online whether purchased fertilizer and seed are 
legitimate and unexpired. 
An alliance of public and private organizations, the 
SeedAssure Alliance, has facilitated the development of a 
new digital technology platform to unblock multiple chal-
lenges in African seed systems. SeedAssure101 will enable 
real-time data collection and secure data sharing across 
multiple seed value chain stakeholders for both qual-
ity assurance and regulatory purposes. The platform will 
operationalize harmonized seed regulation protocols and, 
when fully launched in 2019, is anticipated to expedite 
quality production, commercialization, and trade of seed 
for major crops in eastern and southern Africa.102
Behavior Change
When asked to identify the scale up driver or enabling con-
dition they felt was most often neglected to the detriment 
of the scale up effort, a majority of participants at the Pur-
due conference pointed to behavior change. In reflecting 
on effective media strategies for behavior change and the 
challenges faced by many current strategies for encour-
aging behavior change in pro-poor agriculture, Bill Ryer-
son, founder of the Population Media Center (PMC),103 
reminded conference participants that people rarely change 
their behavior because of information alone. 
Research shows that most behavioral decisions are 
heavily influenced by emotional considerations and cul-
tural norms. Finding creative ways to engage with the audi-
ence and affect what looks like the norm, therefore, can 
be a useful strategy to produce change. The infotainment 
radio and TV programs developed by PMC, for example, 
focus on constructing role model characters with whom 
listeners can identify. During its long-running, multi-issue, 
compelling programs, various characters are developed, 
presented with options, and make choices. To ensure the 
sociocultural relevance of content, all programs are cre-
ated by local writers. Because radio programming is widely 
accessible in low-income countries, these programs reach 
scale immediately. In northern Nigeria, PMC programs on 
family planning reached up to 72% of the whole popu-
lation; and 67% of reproductive health clients in Nigeria 
cited the PMC program as the motivation for their visit.104
Kuza Biashara105 is premised on the importance of start-
ing a conversation with the “client” wherever he or she is, 
providing information that is relevant to their needs, in a 
format that is accessible to them. This Kenya-based digital 
micro-learning and community platform offers people in 
the informal sector access to a library of structured, micro-
module learning that can be accessed by users on demand. 
The models deal with practical, sector-specific skills (from 
smallholder agriculture to masons to bakers), interpersonal 
skills, and business management training. 
Other programs that are more focused on agriculture 
and tap into similar ideas about context and role models 
are also emerging. Shamba Shape-Up,106 a television show 
aired in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania since 2012, features 
co-hosts and a farm-based “makeover reality show” for-
mat that engages participants. Funded through contribu-
tions from development agencies, foundations, and private 
companies, the content of the show is provided by national 
and international research centers. For example, CIMMYT 
partnered with Shamba Shape-Up to produce an episode 
on conservation agriculture.107 Staff interact with viewers 
to find out what topics are of most interest to them. The 
show’s website has now expanded to include a tool to sub-
mit questions offline to be answered by an expert, and an 
agricultural budgeting tool. 
Digital Green,108 an NGO working in India, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, and Afghanistan, trains farmers to make and show 
short videos in which they discuss their problems, share 
solutions, and highlight success stories. It is a technology-
enabled means of behavior change communication built 
around local communities and role models. Research-
ers, development practitioners, and rural villagers come 
together to produce and share locally relevant information 
through videos in which the villagers are the “stars.”
Market forces are, of course, a very powerful force for 
behavior change affecting both consumers and produc-
ers. Rising incomes and urbanization are driving consum-
ers across the globe to demand more meat, poultry, fish, 
fruit and vegetables, and more processed products. This is 
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beginning to change farming systems, creating opportu-
nities for different models of farming such as peri-urban 
farming and protected cultivation, and increasing oppor-
tunities for SMEs offering such things as artisanal process-
ing and food service. Consumer demands are also affecting 
agricultural systems in other ways. Heightened awareness 
of sustainability and concerns for the livelihoods of small-
holder communities by consumers are driving new part-
nerships such as the one between Corteva and CIMMYT 
in Mexico to train farmers and improve sustainable agri-
culture practices, in collaboration with companies such as 
Nestle, Kellogg, and Walmart that are increasingly inter-
ested in responsibly sourced products.109
Institutions
A recurring theme of discussions at the Purdue Scale Up Con-
ference is the worry that the internal institutional incentives 
of most funding agencies and implementing organizations 
are not aligned to support the fundamental changes thought 
to be critical to the scaling process (see Chapter 7). For 
example, flexibility in implementation, including in rede-
signing the approach at stages to reflect learning and accom-
modate changing partnerships, is not typically supported by 
the prevailing project design and contracting process, which 
currently allows little flexibility for midcourse changes. 
Prevailing practice facilitates “partnerships of funding con-
venience” in which “partnered” organizations continue to 
operate largely in siloes.110 It does not facilitate the creation 
of working, strategic, and opportunistic partnerships within 
individual programs or between related sets of programs 
that are not contractually connected to one another from the 
program start. The result is separate programs that address 
agricultural productivity, improved nutrition, strengthening 
value chains, and improving policy in siloed fashion. There 
is no “meta-level” guidance or “system leader” to steer so 
that the yield of the components is something more than a 
summing of individual efforts. 
There is no single formula or easy path to creating the 
enabling environment needed for successful scaling. But 
every intervention that aspires to scale needs to pay intense 
attention to the partnership, policy, behavioral, and insti-
tutional factors on which such scaling will depend. To say 
that these factors are beyond the direct control of inno-
vators does not in any way reduce their centrality or, as 
several examples in this chapter bear witness, mean that 
creative approaches and partnerships cannot be devised to 
influence these factors and overcome barriers. This has far-
reaching implications for the strategy, design, monitoring, 
and exit conditions of more technically conceived inter-
ventions aspiring to reach large populations.
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Tailoring Metrics, Monitoring, 
and Evaluation to Support 
Sustainable Outcomes at Scale 
As noted in Chapter 2, relatively few research or pilot proj-
ects generate the critical information needed to go beyond 
proof of concept and provide a basis for assessing scalabil-
ity, streamlining delivery, informing advocacy, and guiding 
scaling.111 Increasingly, however, scaling experience demon-
strates that the following three overlapping but different 
types or tiers of information are needed (Figure 6.1).112
Tier 1 information is generated to test the efficacy of 
interventions, often under controlled or semicontrolled 
conditions.
Tier 2 information is used to refine, simplify, and adapt 
interventions to real-life policy, financial, and operational 
considerations.
Tier 3 information is generated during the scaling pro-
cess to monitor fidelity and inform needed adjustments to 
intervention design and scaling strategy during the scaling 
process. 
It is tempting to view these tiers as a sequence of infor-
mation needs over time as the focus of scaling moves from 
effectiveness to efficiency to expansion. However, experience 
suggests the need to incorporate efficiency and expansion 
considerations, and to test results under realistic condi-
tions, at the earliest possible time rather than to defer these 
issues until proof of concept is well established. To do oth-
erwise is to run serious risk of adding to the graveyard of 
“proven” but unscalable technologies. 
Figure 6.1. Information Needs for Scaling—a Three-Tier Approach
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It is also important to note that detailed planning is 
no substitute for rapid learning, and for the willingness 
and flexibility to make changes in response to that learn-
ing. With a few notable exceptions, interventions that 
scale successfully take 15 or more years to achieve sustain-
able national scale; and, during that period, they make 
numerous adjustments to accommodate realities that were 
unforeseeable at the outset (Figure 6.2).113
As agricultural interventions scale, one good practice is 
to institutionalize “pause and reflect” sessions at least twice 
a year. Increasingly, however, it is becoming clear that this 
is not enough. The most effective scaling strategies now 
use information technology to drive a variety of real-time 
monitoring tools intended to support frequent changes. 
One Acre Fund, PCE in Senegal, and Babban Gona in Nige-
ria are three instructive examples of the use of real-time 
information to drive implementation and guide scaling. It 
is also important that information systems—particularly 
Tier 3 information systems—incorporate and support the 
information needs of the private sector and the host gov-
ernment at the earliest possible time.114
By definition, scaling places a premium on effects 
and impact beyond a project’s direct reach and duration. 
As such, the focus of monitoring and evaluation necessar-
ily includes—and should prioritize—indirect rather than 
direct beneficiaries, and contribution (or “plausible asso-
ciation”) rather than strict attribution. These realities have 
direct implications for metrics, monitoring, and evalua-
tion, including: 
• It is counterproductive to focus performance 
indicators exclusively on the direct effects of donor 
expenditures.
• For technologies that are bundled with good 
agricultural practices, “adoption” is not a binary 
variable; and packages of innovations are often 
adopted incrementally, partially, or on only a per-
centage of a farmer’s land. 
• Evidence of efficacy under controlled conditions 
needs to be complemented by careful analysis of 
scaling under real-life conditions and constraints. 
• More useful are metrics such as “repeated use,” 
“willingness to pay,” “willingness to recommend to 
a friend or relative,” “competition among suppli-
ers and aggregators”—metrics familiar to growing 
businesses. 
Two informative cases of the effective use of data to 
support long-term scaling efforts are the ongoing work of 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) to pro-
mote the development and use of high-yielding varieties 
in Africa;115 and the work of International Development 
Enterprises—Bangladesh (iDE-B) and CIMMYT to pro-
mote the commercial leasing and use of two-wheel trac-
tors, threshers, and low-lift irrigation pumps.116 These cases 
also underline the point made by several observers that it 
is possible to better integrate project metrics and M&E sys-
tems with the data on sales and marketing, distribution, 
transaction costs, and profitability generated by and useful 
for commercial partners. 
One useful compilation of M&E tools for scaling pro-
poor agricultural interventions comes from a surprising 
source—the health sector.117 Particularly useful are the 
range of tools suggested for Tier 2 and Tier 3 monitoring, 
evaluation, and learning. Tools such as these make it a pos-
sible to track over time the variables and challenges priori-
tized during scalability assessments in ways that meet the 
information needs of famers, agribusinesses, and policy 
makers. 
A methodology called Real-Time Scaling Labs, origi-
nally developed and applied by the Brookings Institution 
in a program called Millions Learning in the education sec-
tor, offers considerable potential for improving knowledge 
about agricultural scaling.118 The approach embeds teams 
within selected interventions, equipped with clear pro-
tocols and a multi-stakeholder participatory process. The 
teams develop and monitor scaling plans in ways designed 
to serve, simultaneously, three objectives: (1) organized 
learning; (2) strategic reflection and review; and (3) doc-
umentation (Figure 6.3). Recent developments in infor-
mation technology, particularly cellphones and remote 
sensing, hold particular promise for making such real-
time or quick-loop learning a practical reality even in low-
resource settings. 
Figure 6.2. The Winding Pathway to Scale
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Finally, it is important to note that, even with the best 
planning and the most diligent management, relatively 
few innovations will—or should—be scaled. The human 
and material costs of change, the potential downside risks 
for adopters, and the inevitability of unpleasant surprises 
along the way mean that the bar should be set high. That 
applies to the viability of the business model as well as the 
efficacy of the innovation. Although the current success 
rate of scaling—estimated at less than 5%—is unacceptably 
low, reported “success” rates in excess of those common 
in the private sector should likewise be cause for concern. 
Given the intensity of donor and market pressures for rapid 
results, compounded by the normal human impulse of 
implementers to fall in love with their interventions, the 
role of effective monitoring and evaluation should often be 
to say “no,” or at least “not yet,” or “not here.”
Figure 6.3. Real-Time Scaling Labs
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The Critical Role of Intermediary 
and Donor Organizations
Few interventions or innovations transition successfully to 
scale without someone performing a variety of “interme-
diation” functions, including investment packaging and 
policy advocacy. In the commercialization of high-margin 
innovations, these functions are often performed by highly 
compensated investment bankers, venture capitalists, and 
strategic consultants.119
By contrast, in the low-margin, high-risk world of pro-
poor agriculture, these semi-invisible functions, which fall 
between the more easily recognized functions of innova-
tion and service delivery, have few reliable funding sources 
or advocates. Lacking the glamor of innovation, the imme-
diacy of direct service delivery, or the prospect of charging 
and recovering significant transactional returns, funding for 
these intermediation functions—with a few notable excep-
tions—becomes a missing link in the value chain or a miss-
ing gear in the scaling “machine” (Figure 7.1). 
The term “intermediation” as used here refers to func-
tions such as: 
• Strategic Planning
• Impact Evaluation and Operations Research
• Fundraising
• Investment Packaging and Placement
• Advocacy and Marketing
• Convening and Coordinating Stakeholders
• Change Management
As presented in Chapter 1, scaling up can be seen as 
a three-step process. The first step focuses on planning for 
scale, the second step focuses on galvanizing necessary 
support, and the third step focuses on carrying out a disci-
plined change management process. Intermediation takes 
different forms during each of these steps. During Step 1—
the planning step—key intermediation functions include 
strategic planning, impact evaluation, and operations 
research. During Step 2—the commitment step—the focus 
of intermediation shifts to convening and coordinating 
stakeholders, fundraising, investment packaging, advocacy, 
and marketing. And during Step 3—the operational step—
the emphasis is on change management, organizational 
development, and systems strengthening. 
There is a key difference between fully commercial 
consumer goods and pro-poor agricultural innovation 
that makes intermediation functions even more impor-
tant in the latter case. For pro-poor agricultural interven-
tions, decisions by governments and third-party funders 
often stand between supply and demand. Reconciling the 
different incentives and operating styles of governments, 
investors, donors, and farmers means that intermediary 
organizations have a particularly important role to play in 
bridging these divides. 
Figure 7.1. The Critical Role and Functions of Intermediary 
Organizations
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In these settings, intermediary organizations often find 
themselves unable to pass the cost of their operations on to 
either the organization doing the innovating or the organi-
zation that potentially delivers the service at scale. There is, 
for this reason, a compelling case for more donor support 
for these intermediary functions and for the organizations 
that carry them out.
Equally profound are the changes needed in the inter-
nal procedures and incentives of donor organizations in 
order to institutionalize a focus on scale and scaling. The 
challenge in this case is to reimagine projects as ways to 
catalyze, de-risk, or otherwise advance systemic change by 
governments and businesses. That requires major changes 
in strategy, metrics, procedures, and incentives to move the 
scaling agenda from the periphery into the mainstream of 
organizational operations. 
Fortunately, there are a growing number of successful 
reform efforts from which to learn. Some donors are setting 
up new entities with an explicit mandate that includes scal-
ing (e.g., Grand Challenges Canada); others are establish-
ing specialized units to foster innovation and/or support 
scaling (e.g., USAID’s Global Development Lab); several 
donor strategies incorporate or prioritize support for inter-
mediary organizations (e.g., the Ford Foundation); and a 
few donors have begun to institute top-to-bottom efforts 
to mainstream scaling as a central feature of organizational 
operations. 
Among the most extensive and instructive efforts to 
mainstream scaling within a donor organization has been 
undertaken by IFAD (Box 7.1), beginning in 2009 with an 
institutional review of its approach120 and later an analy-
sis of its experience in 2013.121 Studies carried out by the 
Brookings Institution informed that effort, and the candid 
evaluation of progress several years later (2017122) offers 
useful touchpoints for other donors considering such 
efforts. 
Box 7.1 IFAD’s Efforts to Institutionalize a Focus on Scale 
An evaluation by IFAD’s Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) and an assessment by a technical team from the 
Brookings Institution,123 both published in 2010, concluded that while IFAD had supported successful scaling 
efforts in particular countries and projects, the fund needed to develop a systematic approach to scaling. The 
Brookings team provided IFAD with specific recommendations on how to mainstream the scaling up agenda 
into its operational policies and practices, its staffing and financial resource management, its monitoring and 
evaluation, and its knowledge management.124
Between 2012 and 2018 IFAD management committed to the scaling up agenda in its action agendas for 
three successive Replenishment Consultations (IFAD9, IFAD10, and IFAD11). To help mainstream scaling up into 
its operations, IFAD prepared in 2015 an “Operational Framework for Scaling Up Results” as a guide for its opera-
tional staff. It also developed various knowledge products (including country and thematic scaling up notes), a 
staff training program, and a website for its scaling up documentation. Since 2015, IFAD has participated actively 
in the global Scaling Up Community of Practice and has led the Working Group on Scaling Up in Agriculture and 
Rural Development.
An evaluation of IFAD’s efforts on scaling up carried out by IOE in 2017 noted that, despite considerable 
progress, “scaling up remains a work in progress,” emphasizing the need to ensure that frontline staff are fully 
engaged in implementing the scaling agenda and that the agenda is shared by IFAD’s partners in the countries 
of its operations.125
There are also a growing number of foundations and 
NGOs incorporating scaling as a central feature of their 
mission, mandate, and operating modalities. Noteworthy 
examples include Catholic Relief Services, which is bas-
ing its new strategy on scaling outcomes related to six key 
interventions; the MacArthur Foundation’s 100&Change 
competition, which awards a single $100 million grant 
to scale a solution to a major problem; collective philan-
thropy efforts by Co-Impact and the Audacious Project; 
and the Eleanor Crook Foundation’s full integration of 
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scaling and sustainability considerations into its grant 
procedures.126
The implications of adopting a scaling perspective are 
no less profound for research institutions. In that regard, 
there are many insights to be gleaned from GIZ’s support 
for a task force of full-time scaling experts that help inte-
grate scaling considerations and a “scaling scan” into the 
CGIAR system127 and from IITA’s efforts to incorporate a 
systematic approach to assessing and enhancing “scaling 
readiness.”
Some of the specific implications of scaling for value 
chain organizations concerned with production, financ-
ing, marketing, and regulation are explored in Chapters 
3, 4, and 5.
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Conclusions
It is time to deepen the discourse, extend the audience, and 
enhance the tools available for (1) designing with scale in 
mind, (2) assessing scalability, and (3) managing the transi-
tion to platforms capable of, and incentivized to, deliver at 
scale. To that end, we conclude with eight insights informed 
by the Purdue conference, side sessions at the 2018 World 
Food Prize, and discussions within the Agriculture and 
Rural Development Working Group of the Global Commu-
nity of Practice on Scaling Development Outcomes:
• Delivery at scale is not a gigantic project or a series 
of projects. We need to plan for millions, not thou-
sands; for uncontrolled, not controlled, settings; 
for generations, not for five years; and for address-
ing, not working around, political and market 
realities. 
• This requires narrowing the gap between macro 
goals and micro interventions, by linking the 
language and logic of projects to the language and 
logic of development effectiveness. 
• Development assistance can help, but it will not 
solve the problem. Only markets and govern-
ments can; and commercial markets should 
normally be the default setting. Short-term inter-
ventions (“projects”) and subsidies can make big 
and positive differences, especially in reaching 
underserved smallholders and SMEs, but only if 
used strategically. They can also introduce major 
distortions. 
• It is essential to view agriculture as a business, 
not a social sector; to treat farmers as businesses 
and customers, not as beneficiaries; and to focus 
more attention on the full value chain, on finance, 
on incentives, on the intermediation needed to 
bring innovation to scale, and on the enabling 
environment. 
• New partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives 
are essential for tackling scaling challenges. 
• Initiatives must go beyond being “policy takers” 
and play a much more proactive role in facilitating 
policy change that can be a scaling force multiplier.
• There is rarely a straight line or a short journey 
from research and innovation to validation and 
rollout. Adaptive management is an essential ingre-
dient in all successful scaling efforts.
• The actions of research institutions, NGOs, and 
other implementing partners are shaped by donor 
policies, metrics, and procedures. Systemic change, 
therefore, needs to give special attention to 
changes in the funding priorities, internal incen-
tives, and operational procedures of those donor 
institutions.
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An Invitation to Continue the Conversation
The September 2018 conference at Purdue University (Fig-
ure 9.1), which inspired this Sourcebook, built on work tak-
ing place under the auspices of a Global Community of 
Practice on Scaling Development Outcomes (CoP). The 
CoP was launched in February 2015 to: 
• Serve as a champion for “scaling up” as a priority 
concern within the development community,
• Develop and disseminate an effective framework 
for scaling,
• Establish a peer network for sharing operational 
approaches, experience, and lessons, 
• Contribute to thought leadership and case exam-
ples on scaling, and
• Provide advice and networking on how to access 
resources and talent.
Figure 9.1. Participants at Scale Up Conference held at Purdue University, September 25–27, 2018. Photo credit: Tim Thompson, 
 Agricultural Communication, Purdue University
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The CoP includes representatives from 250 donor, 
research, and implementing organizations. Its members 
come from a wide variety of sectors and backgrounds, drawn 
together by a common commitment to advancing and pro-
fessionalizing the scaling of development interventions. 
The CoP is member-run, member-supported, and free 
of charge, and includes working groups on: 
• Agriculture and Rural Development
• Education
• Health
• Monitoring and Evaluation
• Scaling in Fragile States
• Youth Employment (planned for 2019)
• Social Enterprise (planned for 2019)
The CoP and its Working Group on Agriculture and 
Rural Development have agreed to host the materials from 
the Purdue conference and to serve as a forum for deepen-
ing the discussions begun there. 
Interested readers are encouraged to reach out directly 
to the organizations cited in this Sourcebook or through the 
CoP with their ideas for building on and enhancing the 
efforts, tools, and approaches presented here; to experi-
ment with the tools cited here and with their own; and to 
document and contribute their thoughts, approaches, and 
experience to our collective understanding on how to scale 
pro-poor agricultural solutions most effectively. 
Those interested in joining the CoP can contact 
its curators, Larry Cooley (lcooley@msi-inc.com) or 
Johannes Linn (jlinn@brookings.edu). Enquiries about 
the CoP’s Working Group on Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment should be directed to Maria Elena Mangiafico 
(m.mangiafico@ifad.org).
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